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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court’s judgement of conviction entered on

the jury’s verdict finding Appellant Alejandro Garcia-Carranza guilty of trafficking
in more than 400 grams of methamphetamine.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
On December 16, 2015, Luis Soria purchased a half-pound of

methamphetamine from an undercover detective (“UC”). Tr. p. 237, ln. 19 - p. 238,
ln. 6. Luis put the UC in touch with his source of supply, later identified as Jesus
Esteban Castro-Angulo, and the two agreed to meet at a later time. Id. at p. 238, ln.
23 - p. 239, ln. 23; p. 302, ln. 10-20.
After communicating by phone and text, the UC and Jesus met in person on
January 13, 2016 in Twin Falls where they discussed meth prices in the UC’s
undercover pickup. Tr. p. 240, ln. 15-25; p. 241, 18 - p. 242, ln. 19; p. 291, ln. 16-24;
p. 294, ln. 6 - p. 295, ln. 5; Exh. 1, Exh 1A; Exh. 3, Exh. 3A. Jesus agreed to sell the
UC a quarter-pound of meth for $2300, which he could have ready in twenty
minutes. Tr. p. 300, ln. 6-12; p. 302, ln. 21 - p. 303, ln. 3; Exh. 3, Exh. 3A. Jesus left
to obtain the methamphetamine and, approximately thirty minutes later, returned
and entered the UC’s pickup. Tr. p. 313, ln. 9-21; p. 323, ln. 8-24; p. 324, ln. 6-19.
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Jesus and the UC completed the quarter pound purchase and the UC then dropped
Jesus off. Tr. p. 327, ln. 2-20; Exh. 3, Exh. 3B.
The UC and Jesus continued to communicate via phone and text regarding
future purchases. Tr. p. 242, ln. 24 - 243, ln. 3; p. 348, ln. 4 - p. 352, ln. 2; Exh. 1, p.
2-3; Exh. 1A p. 2-3. Jesus then contacted the UC from a new number and indicated
that while things had been dry, he hoped to have “veggies” soon. Tr. p. 353, ln. 20
354, ln. 24; p. 355, ln. 6-16. Exh. 8A. The UC then changed his phone number to
keep up his appearance as a legitimate drug dealer. Tr. p. 357, ln. 25 - p. 358, ln. 9.
Via the UC’s new number, the UC and Jesus agreed that Jesus would deliver
two and a quarter pounds of meth the UC at a McDonald’s in Boise on April 14,
2016. Tr. p. 243, ln. 3-12; Exh. 9, p. 1-2; Exh. 9A, p. 1-2. The UC agreed to pay
$16,000 for the two pounds and Jesus agreed to front the quarter-pound to the UC.
Tr. p. 365, ln. 3-20; p. 366, ln. 14- p. 367, ln. 8. The UC told Jesus he was driving
the same pickup and instructed Jesus on where his vehicle was parked. Tr. p. 362,
ln. 5-25; Exh. 10A. Once Jesus parked next to the UC’s pickup, law enforcement
descended on the vehicle with weapons drawn. Tr. p. 535, ln. 3 - p. 536, ln. 3; p, 556,
ln. 6-12; p. 609, ln. 22 - p. 610, ln. 4.
Alejandro — completely unknown to law enforcement — was found in the
backseat behind the driver. Police found the meth in a Doritos and Cheetos chip
bags in the front passenger area, where Alejandro’s older brother Guadalupe
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Garcia-Carranza (“Lupe”) had been seated. Jesus, Lupe and Alejandro were
arrested and charged with trafficking in more than 400 grams of meth.
Prior to trial, the defendants moved in limine to exclude evidence of the
various weights and prices at which the the two and a quarter pounds of
methamphetamine could have been divided and distributed. 41, ln. 13-18; 49, 23-34;
p. 50, 3-20. The defendants did not contest that the sale price’s admissibility —
$16,000. Instead, the defendants argued that primary value of evidence showing
how the methamphetamine could have been distributed on the street was its
emotional impact on the jury. Tr. 47, ln. 4-25. The district court denied the motion,
finding the evidence relevant to the defendants’ knowledge of the meth and that the
evidence was not unduly prejudicial.
At trial, the state asked the UC to “describe for the jury or put into context”
how two and a quarter pounds of methamphetamine “relates to street-level
distribution.” The UC explained that if he took:
that 1 pound of methamphetamine and [resold] it out on the street or to another
distributor, such as the role that I'm playing. I could sell it in ounces, sell it in
quarter pounds depending on the type of clientele that I had.
If I was selling it by ounces, I could obtain anywhere between -- well, prices
at that time and right now, probably about $450 to $800 per ounce of that
methamphetamine.
If I broke it down even more and sold at lower levels, I could sell it at an
eighth of an ounce, or commonly known as an eight ball.
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Now, the eight balls will go for 120 to $200 per eight ball for one eighth of an
ounce, or 3 1/2 grams.
If I broke it down even further, I could go down to what is called a teener, a
16th of an ounce, or 1.75 grams, and I could sell that anywhere between 70 to
maybe $90 per teener.
Tr. p. 460, ln. 25 - p. 461, ln. 19. The UC testified that the methamphetamine
recovered on April 15, 2016, was valuable not only because he was paying 16,000 for
it, but also based upon how it could be distributed. Tr. p. 464, ln. 7-12.
After trial, the jury found Alejandro guilty of trafficking in more than 400
grams of methamphetamine. The district court sentenced Alejandro to a unified
term of fifteen years with a minimum period of confinement of ten years. This
appeal follows.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Should this Court vacate Alejandro’s judgment of conviction because

insufficient evidence supported the verdict in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution?
2.

Should this Court reverse Alejandro’s judgment of conviction because

evidence of the various weights and prices for which the meth could have been
distributed on street was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial and cannot be considered
harmless?
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IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Insufficient Evidence Supported the Verdict
The right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution includes protection against “the onus of a criminal
conviction except upon sufficient proof - defined as evidence necessary to convince a
trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the
offense.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012), citing
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). This Court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460, 272 P.3d at
432.
Alejandro was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of
I.C. § 37-2732B(4)(C), which applies to any person “who is knowingly in actual or
constructive possession of” four hundred (400) grams or more of methamphetamine.
Here, while the state presented sufficient evidence to find Alejandro knew the
packages were in the vehicle, it failed to present sufficient evidence that Alejandro
knew those packages contained methamphetamine or that he had the power and
intent to control the packages. Accordingly, Alejandro’s conviction violates the due
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process as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and his judgment of conviction
must be vacated.
1.
The state presented insufficient evidence to support a finding
that Alejandro knew the packages contained methamphetamine
beyond a reasonable doubt
To support a conviction for possession or distribution of methamphetamine in
violation of I.C. § 37-2732, the state need only prove the defendant “knew it was
methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance.” State v. Heiner, 163
Idaho 99, 408 P.3d 97, 101 (Ct. App. 2017); see also ICJI 403 (Possession of a
Controlled Substance). Conversely, trafficking in methamphetamine requires the
state to establish the defendant knowingly possessed methamphetamine. I.C. §
37-2732B(4). The state could not meet this burden by showing Alejandro knew he
possessed a controlled substance and, instead, was required to prove Alejandro
“knew it was methamphetamine.” CR 105; see also ICJI 406D (Trafficking in
Methamphetamine) (defendant possessed methamphetamine and knew it was
methamphetamine).
While the state presented sufficient evidence to support that Alejandro knew
the packages contained an illegal substance, it failed to present sufficient evidence
that Alejandro knew the packages contained methamphetamine. In presenting
evidence of Alejandro’s interrogation, the prosecutor queried whether the detective
had asked “Alejandro about the methamphetamine, the two and a half or two and a
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quarter pounds of methamphetamine that were located in the Jeep on April 15th”
and whether he asked “if he brought that methamphetamine from Las Vegas or
California.” (emphasis added). Similarly, the detective testified that Alejandro
informed him he first saw the “methamphetamine” in the hotel room he was staying
at. p. 704, ln. 23 - p. 705, ln. 2.
However, this testimony did not reflect a verbatim conversation and referring
to the packages as “methamphetamine” simply reflected that the state had
identified the package’s contents. The state elicited no testimony that Alejandro
described the packages as methamphetamine, “ice” or any term suggesting he knew
the packages contained methamphetamine. The detective did not testify that he
asked Alejandro whether he knew or had seen what was inside the packages. The
only testimony regarding Alejandro’s understanding of the packages’ contents was
that he perceived they were dangerous when he found them in the hotel room.
Nor was there circumstantial evidence that Alejandro was familiar with
drugs or the drug trafficking. While the investigation spanned several months,
Alejandro did not appear on law enforcement's radar until its conclusion, when he
was found sitting behind Jesus. Tr. p. 248, ln. 6-8; p. 380 ln. 2-8; p. 500, ln. 5-13; p.
657, ln. 2-17. Following his arrest, Alejandro agreed to speak with officers.
Alejandro shared that he and his older brother Lupe had lived together for a couple
months in Las Vegas until Lupe needed to move because he was not getting along
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with an Aunt. Tr. p. 735, ln. 3-17. Prior to living in Las Vegas, Alejandro had
limited contact Guadalupe.
Alejandro explained he had been invited to work at an Idaho dairy milking
cows. Tr. p. 704, ln. 2-5. In a “Whats App” chat conversation between Alejandro and
a friend, the two discussing desiring legitimate employment and how work is
difficult to find. Tr. p. 511, ln. 19 - p. 512, ln. 8. Alejandro’s luggage was in the
vehicle as he intended to spend some time in Boise to see if he would like to live
there. Tr. 549, ln. 14 - p. 550, ln. 8; p. 726 2-4
The photographs found on Alejandro’s phone, which had a number with an
area code for the Lake Tahoe area, included several “selfies,” photographs of a white
dog, a mountain lake and snow. Tr. p. 503, ln. 20-23; p. 513, ln. 22 - p. 515, ln. 4.
Nothing in Alejandro’s possession suggested that he used or sold drugs
Alejandro denied bringing packages to Idaho and explained that he first saw
them on April 14, 2016 at the hotel room in Twin Falls and that he perceived they
were something dangerous. Tr. p. 704, ln. 14 - p. 705, ln. 4; p. 724, ln. 4-22. After
finding the packages, he photographed them with his phone. Alejandro sent a
message via Whats App to his friend saying “perhaps he would be his thrower” and,
twenty minutes later, sent the photograph of the packages. Tr. p. 443, ln. 7-23; p.
444, ln. 5-8. According to the UC, “thrower” in context of the photograph of the
packages signified “that is going to be throwing, dealing that -- what's in those
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pictures.” Tr. p. 454, ln. 1 - p. 455, ln. 7; p. 457, ln. 17 - p. 458, ln. 23. While the
photograph and conversation support that Alejandro knew the packages contained
some kind of contraband, they fail to support that Alejandro specifically knew they
contained methamphetamine.
The photograph and chat also fail to support that Lupe or Jesus brought
Alejandro fully into the loop regarding the trip to Boise. To the contrary, neither
Jesus nor Lupe’s telephones included pictures of the narcotics. The UC conceded
that people do not usually photograph their narcotics with “good reason.” Tr. p. 476,
ln. 3-10; p. 498, ln. 15-25. Indeed, the UC testified at length about how drug
traffickers utilize code and avoid overt communications. Alejandro’s conduct in
photographing and messaging establish he was not familiar with drug trafficking.
In closing, the state claimed that a message from the friend sent later that
same morning in which he indicates that another acquaintance “says if you're going
to sell to the cows” is an indication that Alex and the person he is talking to know
exactly what that methamphetamine is and that you sell it. Tr. p. 788, 10-23 While
the message supports an understanding the packages are meant to be sold, the
evidence fails to support that Alejandro knew the packages contained
methamphetamine.
Neither Alejandros’ decision to photograph the packages nor his decision to
message the photo to his friend would have been authorized by his older brother or
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Jesus. Instead, Alejandro must have discovered the packages and surreptitiously
photographed them to message to his friend without his brother or Jesus’
knowledge. His naive and dangerous decision to do so and to send the photograph to
his friend weigh against knowledge of the specific nature of the contraband.
The state failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that
Alejandro knew the packages contained methamphetamine beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, this Court should vacate his judgment of conviction.
2.

Insufficient evidence permitted the jury to find Alejandro had
the power and intent to control the packages

In order to prove constructive possession, the state must independently prove
both knowledge and control beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho
356, 360, 900 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1995); State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 647, 945
P.2d 1390, 1393 (Ct.App.1997); see also State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 638, 262
P.3d 278, 281 (Ct. App. 2011). Constructive possession cannot be inferred from the
mere fact that the defendant occupied the vehicle with others in which the drugs
were seized. State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 885, 771 P.2d 546, 549 (Ct.App.1989);
see also State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706, 889 P.2d 729, 735 (Ct.App.1994).
Indeed, where joint occupancy is involved, substantial evidence must exist
establishing the guilt of each defendant, not merely the collective guilt of both. State
v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 178, 345 P.3d 232, 237 (Ct. App. 2014); Garza, 112
Idaho at 784–85, 735 P.2d at 1095–96. Nor can the state establish “control” with
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evidence of “mere proximity to the contraband,” even when the accused knew of the
contraband’s presence. State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 542, 861 P.2d 107, 112 (Ct.
App. 1993); State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 776, 735 P.2d 1087 (Ct. App. 1987). Instead,
the state must establish a sufficient nexus between the accused and the substance
so as to give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a
bystander but, rather, had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control
over the substance. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho at 647, 945 P.2d at 1393; Garza, 112
Idaho at 784, 735 P.2d at 1095.
While the investigation spanned several months, Alejandro did not appear on
law enforcement's radar until its conclusion, when he was found sitting behind
Jesus. Tr. p. 248, ln. 6-8; Tr. p. 380 ln. 2-8; Tr. p. 500, ln. 5-13; Tr. p. 657, ln. 2-17.
The state noted that Lupe and Alejandro were traveling during the time frame that
Jesus has told the UC that the “family” was on its way and that the meeting was
scheduled for shortly after Lupe and Alejandro arrived in Twin Falls. Tr. p. 790, ln.
1-9. The state argued “It's not reasonable to believe that Alejandro and Guadalupe
were not participants, that they were just along for the ride” since it would put
everyone and the deal at risk to have individuals “who aren't in the know.”
However, the state must independently establish Alejandro’s guilt by
substantial evidence and can not merely rely on Lupe’s collective guilt. Southwick,
158 Idaho at 178, 345 P.3d at 237; Garza, 112 Idaho at 784–85, 735 P.2d at 1095–
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96. Jesus and Lupe communicated with during the period when Jesus advised the
UC that his “family was coming” and as he coordinated the sale to the UC. Tr. p.
421, ln. 24 - p. 423, ln. 3; 434, ln. 3-14; p. 434, ln. 21 - p. 436, ln. 11. There were no
communications between Jesus and Alejandro or evidence of ties between the two.
p. 438, ln. 19 - p. 439, ln. 1; p. 501, ln. 3-5; p. 502, 5-25. Alejandro was not in Jesus’
contacts and Alejandro barely knew Jesus. Tr. p. 503, ln. 4-9. 724, ln. 4-22. There is
no evidence that Alejandro participated in the planning or had any ownership
interest in the packages.
The state relied heavily on Alejandro’s admission that he pulled the packages
from an area in the back seat where he was seated, placed them into a Doritos bag
and passed that bag to the front of the car. Tr. p. 705, ln. 11-19. The state argue
“you can't participate more than hiding the” packages in a chip bag. Tr. p. 790, 1-25.
However, placing the packages into a Dorito’s bag to hand up to his big brother fails
to imply power and intent to control the packages. There are endless scenarios
illustrating backseat passengers handing items to the front seat on a road trip
(including handing up a bag with actual Doritos) where the backseat passenger has
no power over the object other than to hand it to the owner in the front seat.
Handing the packages to the front seat while only the three men were in the car
certainly did not further the offense in any material manner and establishes no
more than that Alejandro knew the packages were in the vehicle.
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Had law enforcement waited to arrest Jesus until after the controlled buy
was complete, we would know whether Jesus entered the UC’s vehicle alone as he
had before, whether Lupe would accompany him while Alejandro waited in the car
or whether Alejandro would exhibit some active participation in the exchange.
As it stands, the state presented no evidence that Alejandro was familiar
with methamphetamine or methamphetamine trade, no evidence that he had any
stake in the sale, and no evidence that he accompanied his brother intending to
facilitate the transaction and no evidence. The state failed to present sufficient
evidence to support the verdict and this Court should vacate the judgement of
conviction.
B.

District Court Erred in Denying Motion in Limine and Permitting
the UC to Testify Regarding Various Weights and Prices For Which
the Methamphetamine Could Be Distributed
This Court reviews the admissibility of evidence using a mixed standard of

review — whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law subject to free review
whereas it lies within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether the
evidence’s probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1,
6, 304 P.3d 276, 281 (2013); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221
(2008) If this Court determines the district court erroneously admitted evidence, the
state bears the burden to demonstrate that the error is harmless beyond a
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reasonable doubt. Joy, 155 Idaho at 11, 304 P.3d at 286; State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010).
Here, Alejandro moved in limine to preclude evidence of the varying weights
and prices at which the meth could have been sold on the street. Tr. 41, ln. 13-18; p.
49, 23-34. Alejandro did not seek to preclude the negotiated sale price of $16,000
and, instead, contended that allowing the UC to speculate how the meth could have
divided and sold in the hypothetical situation that he was an actual drug dealer was
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Tr. p. 43, ln. 17-25; 47, ln. 4-11. p. 48, ln. 1-11.
The district court denied the motion, finding the evidence “very relevant
when there is a valuable object and multiple people are involved in its
transportation and delivery to consider the inference that a person would not let
people accompany them delivering valuable objects, unless they were also
participants in the same project.” Tr. p. 48, ln. 12-25. The district court further
found the probative value to be high and that it outweighed any prejudicial effect.
Tr. p. 49, ln. 1-14. The district court thus denied the motion in limine. Tr. p. 49, ln.
1-14. The district court deemed the issue adequately preserved for appeal and
instructed counsel that there was no need to object to the detective’s testimony
during trial. Tr. p. 50, ln. 3-20
However, unlike the negotiated sale price, hypothetical testimony describing
how far down two and quarter pounds of meth might have been distributed if the
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UC had been a drug dealer do not increase the probability that Alejandro had the
power and intent to control the methamphetamine. Any minimal relevance is
substantially outweighed by the risk of inflaming the jury by ensuring they
understood just how many doses were comprised within the two and quarter
pounds.
The district court erred in finding the evidence of street level distribution
relevant and abused its discretion in finding that any probative value was not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The state cannot show that the
erroneous admission of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and
this Court should vacate Alejandro’s judgment of conviction.
1.

Irrelevant

“ ‘Relevant Evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401. The
more controlled substance found in a defendant's possession, the greater the
inference of knowledge. State v. Ortiz, 148 Idaho 38, 41, 218 P.3d 17, 20 (Ct. App.
2009); State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 152, 983 P.2d 217, 225 (Ct. App. 1999).
The district court found the street value evidence “highly relevant” because
“it is quite logical that if a person is moving an illegal, valuable object that they
would not feel comfortable with inviting the sisters of charity to join them.” Tr. p. 49
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5-8; see also 41, ln. 19-25; p. 42, ln. 1-3. However, the $16,000 sale price identified
the substance’s value to Jesus and Lupe and that price was as relevant to the
probability that Jesus or Lupe would allow a non participant on the trip to Boise.
Conversely, the meth’s value to the UC (in the hypothetical scenario he was
not a UC) does not increase its value to Jesus, who agreed to sell for $16,000
regardless of how the UC elected to distribute it. And additional evidence that the
two and quarter pounds could be sold at weights varying from a quarter-pound to a
sixteenth of an ounce did not make it even more probable that Jesus or Lupe would
not allow a non participant in the vehicle.
This case can be distinguished from Ortiz, where neither a sale price nor the
precise weight were known. There, an investigator testified regarding the value and
number of doses of methamphetamine found in the defendant’s car. The Court
found that the investigator’s testimony was relevant for the juror's evaluation of
whether it was plausible that a substance of that value would have been
intentionally or accidentally left there by a third person. Ortiz, 148 Idaho at 41, 218
P.3d at 20.
Here, the jury knew both the weight and price of the methamphetamine, both
of which were relevant to knowledge. Additional evidence regarding the weights at
which that methamphetamine could be sold by others is irrelevant to Alejandro’s
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participation.1 The district court erred in finding the evidence relevant and denying
the motion in limine.
2.

Even if relevant, the evidence’s probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. I.R.E. 403. The trial
court’s balancing of the factors in Rule 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, in
which this Court determines: (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the
issue was discretionary; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of
its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether
it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 912,
354 P.3d 462, 474 (2015); Stevens, 146 Idaho at143, 191 P.3d at 221.
The district court based its conclusion that the risk of unfair prejudice did not
substantially outweigh the probative value on the finding that the evidence was
very probative. However, the district court failed to address the probative value of
the sale price or explain how the street level distribution possibilities made it even
less likely Jesus or Lupe would include a non participant.

Evidence regarding the economic retail value of the substances and expert testimony
concerning typical patterns of use and sale are relevant to prove of intent to deliver. State v.
O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 68, 644 P.2d 985, 991 (Ct. App. 1982). Proof of intent to deliver is
unnecessary under Idaho’s trafficking statute.
1
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The district court also failed to recognize the emotional impact of the street
value evidence. Evidence that the two and quarter pounds could be sold as 640
“teeners” at $70 to $90 each invited the jurors to contemplate how widely the drug
could have been sold. Such evidence reinforces the dangers of the drug and risks the
jury judging Alejandro on their passions rather than the evidence.
Evidence of the street-level distribution possibilities was marginally relevant
to Alejandro’s knowledge, especially considering the evidence of weight and saleprice. That minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice. The district court abused its discretion in denying the motion in
limine.
3.

Not harmless

This Court applies the harmless error test articulated by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Joy, 155 Idaho
at 11, 304 P.3d at 286; Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974. Under the two-part
Chapman test, once the defendant establishes error, the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24: Joy, 155 Idaho at 11, 304 P.3d at 286. To say
that an error did not contribute to the verdict is to find that error unimportant in
relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed
in the record. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled in part on other

18

grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n. 4 (1991). Thus, an appellate
court's inquiry “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993); Joy, 155 Idaho at 11, 304 P.3d at 286.
During closing, the prosecutor reminded the jury that it heard from the UC
“about how this amount of methamphetamine can be distributed down to a teener,
which is 1.75 grams, an eight ball, which is 3.5 grams common weight. You have an
example of how far down methamphetamine can be divided.” Given the tenuous
evidence tying Alejandro to the operation, it is not possible to conclude that the
inadmissible evidence did not effect the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The district
court’s decision to allow evidence of the street-level distribution possibilities was not
harmless and this Court should reverse the judgment of conviction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The state failed to present sufficient evidence that Alejandro knowingly
possessed methamphetamine and his judgment of conviction thus violates the due
process guarantee that a guilty verdict be supported by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Even if sufficient evidence supports the verdict, the district court erroneously
permitted evidence of the various weights and prices the UC could have used in
distributing the two and quarter pounds of methamphetamine. This evidence was
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unnecessary since the sale price was known and calculated to inflame the jury by
allowing them to conceptualize the number of people who could have used the
methamphetamine. Especially given the limited evidence tying Alejandro to the
packages, the state cannot show that the erroneous admission was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Alejandra respectfully asks this Court to vacate
his judgment of conviction.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of March, 2018
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